American Perceptions of Environmental Justice

Scholars have shown that low-income communities and communities of color suffer worse outcomes than affluent and whiter communities in the domains of housing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2020), policing (Davis et al., 2018; Glaser 2014), healthcare (World Health Organization, 2018), and education (Brown, 2010; Noltemeyer et al., 2012). Yet for many years, issues related to the environment and climate change were viewed as distinct from those related to justice and fairness. People who engaged in environmentalism were perceived as working on a “rich person’s problem,” and this perception was especially strong among poorer individuals (Laidley, 2013; Latkin et al., 2021).

However, more recently, scholars and community members have increasingly viewed the issue of climate change through the prism of justice and fairness. This realization about the inequitable effects of climate change is the foundation of the environmental justice movement, which has existed since the 1960s, to address the unfair exposure of people in lower-income communities and communities of color to the harms of pollution and the general degradation of the natural environment (Schlosberg, 2007). The first generation of environmental justice scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the location of toxic waste near low-income communities and communities of color (Bullard, 1990; Chavis and Lee, 1987). More recently, the field has expanded to recognize climate change as having important and unequal effects on some segments of society (Vanderheiden, 2016).

As natural disasters and instances of extreme heat result in property damage, displacement, hospitalizations, and even death, experts note that many of the negative consequences of climate change are borne disproportionately by people with fewer resources—individuals who often are members of lower-income communities or communities of color (Mohai et al., 2009).

Environmental injustice as it relates to climate change may stem from three sources of inequality. First, poorer and minority groups may live in places that put them at increased risk for particular climate-related events. For example, in cities, the abundance of concrete and scarcity of trees in impoverished neighborhoods create “urban heat islands,” which lead lower-income people or people of color to experience higher temperatures than communities with more high-income or white people in the same city (Harlan et al., 2006).

Second, economically disadvantaged Americans may be less resilient to the effects of climate change. They have fewer resources to prepare for, respond to, and recover from heat and extreme weather. These factors make them especially vulnerable in the future, as climate change increases the frequency and severity of extreme weather and wildfires (Environmental Protection Agency, 2022).

Increased risk and lower resiliency may be addressed through effective government policies, which brings us to the third source of inequality: differential government responsiveness. Although local, state, and federal governments may be able to help lower-income communities and communities of color invest in mitigation efforts, many experts have found that government has done more to help affluent and whiter communities prepare for and recover from climate change-related weather events. Policies that are intended to help all people recover after a disaster may inadvertently exacerbate issues of inequality, helping wealthier and whiter homeowners more than lower-income people and people of color.

Extensive literature has shown that Black and Hispanic Americans, by virtue of their personal experiences with environmental deprivation, have been more concerned about issues of the environment than white Americans (Jones, 1998, 2002; Jones and Carter, 1994; Jones and Rainey, 2006; Mohai, 2003; Taylor, 1989). Although much of this research has focused on the immediate local environment, being personally exposed to the negative consequences of climate change could create similar patterns in public opinion, especially as extreme weather events associated with climate change have direct and local impacts.

In light of the multitude of climate change-related problems facing lower-income people and people of color in the United States, and given the solutions proposed by policy advocates, we explored a number of questions related to environmental justice with the 2024 Climate Insights Survey. We wondered: do poorer people or richer people view climate change as a greater threat to them personally? Are people of color aware of their increased vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change? Given the disproportionate risks faced by and the lower resiliency of lower-income communities, do people in the United States view climate change as more likely to hurt poorer people than richer people? Finally, do people support government policies intended to address environmental injustices in the United States, and what factors predict that support?

In the 2024 Climate Insights Survey, about 30 percent of all Americans believe that global warming will hurt them “a great deal” or “a lot,” regardless of their income. Likewise, 25 percent of people earning $100,000 or more a year and 32 percent of people earning less than $50,000 believe that global warming will not hurt them at all (Figure 1). Thus, perceived personal vulnerability does not appear to vary notably with income.

We found surprising results regarding perceptions of personal vulnerability by racial and ethnicity categories (Figure 2). Hispanics, who are more likely to live in areas prone to extreme weather events and are more likely to hold jobs requiring them to work outside, do not perceive themselves to be especially threatened by a changing climate (Crimmins et al., 2016). 16 percent believe that global warming will hurt them “a great deal,” compared to 17 percent of non-Hispanic whites. That said, there was evidence that Black people feel more vulnerable to the effects of global warming: 27 percent believe that future warming will hurt them a great deal.

Although the effects of global warming will likely be felt more by people with fewer resources, not all Americans share that view (Figure 3). Only 52 percent of Americans believe that poorer people are more vulnerable than richer people to the effects of global warming. Whereas 42 percent of Americans believe that global warming will affect people at different income levels the same amount, a few Americans believe that richer people will be hurt more by global warming than poorer people (5 percent).

The survey explored perceptions of environmental injustice and support for policies to address inequalities in light of expert views of the disparate effects of climate change. After being informed that many scientists believe that climate events will disproportionately hurt lower-income people, who also have less money to recover from extreme weather events, Americans are overwhelmingly supportive of efforts by the government to target aid to people most in need (Figure 4). Fully 85 percent favor such measures, while only 14 percent oppose them.

With regard to specific policies that local, state, and federal governments can implement to make vulnerable populations more resilient to climate change, we asked about two types of insurance: (1) standard homeowners’ insurance, which covers damage from hurricanes and wildfires, and (2) specialized insurance policies designed to cover damage from floods. About two-thirds of Americans favor targeted aid in the form of subsidies to help poorer homeowners and renters purchase insurance to protect against wildfire or hurricane damage. 68 percent of Americans favor wildfire and hurricane insurance subsidies for poorer homeowners (Figure 5a), whereas 66 percent favor similar insurance for poorer renters (Figure 5b).

Similarly, many Americans favor government policies to assist poorer homeowners and renters in buying flood insurance. By roughly a 2-to-1 margin, Americans want the government to provide such aid, with the status of the aid recipient (homeowner vs. renter) not influencing policy support. 68 percent of Americans favor flood insurance assistance for homeowners, and 65 percent favor it for renters (Figures 6a and 6b).

Finally, we examined attitudes toward the federal government purchasing homes from people who want to move out of areas prone to wildfires, floods, and hurricanes. Although many Americans live in such areas, not all Americans can muster the resources necessary to purchase property in safer areas and uproot their lives. As the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) updates maps of flood plains, some Americans find their homes are not only at risk but have depreciated greatly in value, making it difficult to afford housing in safer areas. Despite these hurdles, Americans are far less favorable toward assistance policies in this arena than others we examined (Figure 7). 48 percent of Americans favor the government buying the homes of poorer people who want to move to safer areas–a substantial number, but not a majority.

In this section, we explore whether attitudes toward environmental justice policies differ based on income or their political party affiliations.

Because lower-income individuals stand more to gain from targeted policies intended to help these Americans cope with climate-related disasters, we might expect that recognition of the problem and support for addressing it would be higher among lower-income individuals.

However, individuals with lower incomes are less likely to perceive that climate change will disproportionately hurt poorer people (Figure 8). This helps contextualize the results in Figure 1, which shows that few lower-income Americans believe that climate change will personally harm them. These two findings show that poorer Americans don’t perceive themselves to personally be more vulnerable.

Larger differences emerged along partisan lines. 70 percent of Democrats believe that climate change will disproportionately hurt lower-income people, compared to only 33 percent of Republicans and 48 percent of Independents.

Prior to asking respondents about their views of specific policies, respondents were informed that scientists believe that floods, wildfires, and hurricanes will hurt poorer people more than richer people, and that poorer people have fewer resources to recover. After being informed of these expert views, support for government efforts to address environmental injustices is high, though significant divides along economic and political lines appeared (Figure 9).

85 percent of Americans believe that the government should provide help to poorer people to recover from extreme weather events caused by global warming (Figure 4). 89 percent of people making less than $50,000 are supportive. Support drops seven percentage points to 82 percent among people making $100,000 or more. The partisan divide is larger, with nearly unanimous (97 percent) support for targeted government aid among Democrats, 74 percent among Republicans, and 83 percent among Independents.

Similar patterns appeared in opinions about government subsidies to provide wildfire/hurricane and flood insurance for renters and homeowners. Divides appeared according to economic class and partisanship, with the differences especially large between Democrats and Republicans. 68 percent of all Americans favor the government paying at least some of the cost to insure homes against wildfire and hurricane damage for lower-income individuals (Figure 5). Support is higher among families earning less than $50,000 a year (75 percent support for assistance to homeowners, and 73 percent support for assistance to renters) and among Democrats (86 percent support for assistance to homeowners, and 78 percent support for assistance to renters). Support is lower among families earning more than $100,000 (60 percent support for assistance to homeowners, and 58 percent support for assistance to renters) and among Republicans (54 percent support for assistance to homeowners and 52 percent support for assistance to renters) (Figures 10a and 10b).

A majority of Americans favor targeted government assistance for flood insurance (66 percent), but a substantial divide exists along partisan lines (Figure 11). Democrats overwhelmingly favor assistance (83 percent), whereas Republicans are more evenly divided (49 percent favor). Although a similar divide exists across income levels, that divide is less pronounced. Whereas there is a greater than 30-point difference between Democrats and Republicans, there is less than a 15-point difference between people earning under $50,000 and people earning more than $100,000 when it comes to flood insurance assistance for homeowners and renters (Figures 11a and 11b).

The idea that the federal government should purchase the homes of people with fewer resources who wish to move to a safer location is the least popular among the policies we investigated, with only 48 percent favoring it, and 50 percent opposing it (Figure 7). Again, a divide emerged along political and economic lines. 65 percent of Democrats favor the policy, compared to only 32 percent of Republicans. And 60 percent of people earning less than $50,000 favor the proposal, compared to 43 percent of people earning $100,000 or more (Figure 12).

Self-interest seems to play only a modest role in shaping opinions about policies intended to address environmental injustice. The partisan divide is larger than the economic divide regarding policies that target lower-income people’s resilience in the face of climate-related disasters.

One area in which we looked for self-interest effects involves aid that benefits homeowners versus renters. Overall, homeowners are less supportive of targeted government aid for wildfire, hurricane, and flood insurance. Homeowners’ support for such aid hovers around 60 percent, regardless of whether the policy is intended to help homeowners or renters (Figures 13 and 14). Renters’ support is higher, at nearly 80 percent for insurance assistance, but again, this support does not differ greatly based on whether aid is intended for homeowners or renters. Although there is a substantial divide between renters and homeowners on the question of government subsidies, that divide does not appear to be closely related to whether a policy will benefit a particular individual personally.

The 2024 Climate Insights survey revealed generally high levels of support for policies intended to address the negative effects of global warming and suggests a number of factors that could explain variation in that support. Political factors such as partisanship, and self-interest factors such as income, are related to some of the variation in public opinion regarding environmental justice policies. Moreover, partisanship and self-interest factors are associated with awareness of the problems facing poorer individuals as they prepare for and recover from climate-related disasters.

To explore what factors best explain variation in public support for or opposition to environmental justice policies, we developed and tested a predictive model (Figure 15). For the methodology, read the appendix below.

The model considered a possible connection between self-interest and support for policies. We asked questions focused on efforts that target poorer Americans and hypothesized that poorer individuals may be especially likely to support such policies designed to address environmental injustice. Although we focused on income as a self-interest factor, we also explored differences between renters and homeowners, as well as differences based on race and ethnicity.

We also hypothesized that believing that climate change will disproportionately hurt lower-income individuals may be a significant factor in driving policy support. Not all individuals who are aware of environmental injustice support the government taking remedial action.

Partisanship, self-interest, and awareness of environmental injustice strongly relate to attitudes toward governmental intervention on behalf of lower-income Americans (Figure 16). A strong Democrat is nearly 99 percent likely to want the government to intervene on behalf of lower-income people to deal with events like floods, wildfires, and hurricanes, whereas a strong Republican is 75 percent likely to say the same, notably lower than the figure for strong Democrats but still a very substantial proportion.

More modest differences appear with regard to income: people earning less than $20,000 are 90 percent likely to support government help, and this drops to 82 percent among people earning more than $100,000 per year.

With regard to environmental justice awareness, people who believe that climate change hurts poorer people and richer people equally are most opposed to targeted government aid. Of those individuals, 78 percent favor such aid, whereas people who believe climate change hurts poorer people more are 92 percent likely to express support.

Renters are similarly more supportive of targeted aid (91 percent) than homeowners (83 percent), though no stark differences appear across racial and ethnic groups.

All racial and ethnic categories support government assistance about equally, with that support ranging from 85 percent among unspecified races/ethnicities to 89 percent among Hispanics.

Partisanship, income, and environmental justice awareness are strong predictors of support for government assistance for homeowner’s insurance to help lower-income people recover from wildfires and hurricanes (Figure 17). Partisanship stands out, with strong Democrats 88 percent likely to favor such assistance, whereas strong Republicans are less than 55 percent likely to express support. Many Americans in the lowest income category favor government aid for homeowner insurance (82 percent), whereas the most affluent are more mixed (59 percent favor).

Individuals who believe that climate change hurts poorer people more support this policy at 75 percent, whereas people who think that climate change will hurt both groups equally (65 percent) and people who think that climate change will hurt the richer more (62 percent) are less likely to be supportive.

Despite the policy itself being targeted to homeowners, both renters (72 percent) and homeowners (69 percent) are similarly likely to support it.

Finally, non-Hispanic whites have the lowest likelihood of supporting insurance assistance (65 percent), whereas non-Hispanic Black people (73 percent) and Hispanic people (86 percent) are more likely to be supportive.

Predicting support for assistance directed to renters to recover from wildfires and hurricanes reveals a similar pattern as is seen predicting support for homeowners, though with some exceptions (Figure 18). Partisanship again produces the largest split in preferences, with strong Democrats (83 percent) much more likely than strong Republicans (58 percent) to favor aid.

People earning less than $20,000 were 80 percent likely to favor insurance assistance, whereas people earning more than $100,000 were 57 percent likely to favor such help.

Differences across environmental justice awareness levels are more modest, with people who are most aware being 72 percent likely to favor the targeted renters’ insurance aid. People who believe that climate change hurts the poor and rich the same and people who believe that climate change hurts the rich more are less supportive, at 60 percent and 65 percent, respectively.

We find a small split between renters and homeowners on the question of targeted aid to renters. Renters are slightly more likely to support such assistance (71 percent) than homeowners (65 percent).

Among non-Hispanic white people, support for renters’ insurance assistance is 64 percent likely and rises to 79 percent among non-Hispanic Black people and 72 percent for Hispanic people.

The correlates of support for homeowner and renters’ insurance revealed in Figures 17 and 18 manifest similarly when looking at support for targeted flood insurance for homeowners (Figure 19) and renters (Figure 20). Strong Democrats are consistently more supportive of targeted aid, to the tune of being roughly 30 percentage points more likely than strong Republicans to express such support.

Differences of nearly 20 percentage points appear between the lowest and highest income Americans.

Environmental justice awareness is similarly a strong predictor, though people who are most likely to express opposition to environmental justice policies are not people who believe that richer people are hurt the most by climate change, but rather people who believe that climate change affects richer and poorer people equally.

Renters are more supportive of flood insurance assistance than homeowners, regardless of whether the policy is specifically targeted toward renters or homeowners.

Finally, although non-Hispanic white people are generally supportive of targeted flood insurance assistance for homeowners (66 percent) and renters (63 percent), support is more likely among non-Hispanic Black people (83 percent and 86 percent, respectively)

Among the policies examined here, government purchasing of homes built in unsafe locations is the least popular (Figure 7). Yet the predictors of support of this policy are similar to those of other environmental justice proposals. Strong Democrats are more likely to favor the home buyback program (67 percent) than strong Republicans (38 percent) (Figure 21).

People earning less than $20,000 are 60 percent likely to favor the policy, and support drops to 42 percent among the most affluent people.

Environmental justice awareness similarly predicts support, with people who are aware of environmental justice problems 54 percent likely to favor the policy, compared to 41 percent for people who believe that climate change hurts richer people more.

Renters are 57 percent likely to favor the government buyback program, and homeowners are only 45 percent likely to favor the program.

Differences along racial and ethnic lines are more modest. Non-Hispanic Whites are 49 percent likely to favor the policy, whereas non-Hispanic Blacks are 55 percent likely to favor the policy, and Hispanics are 49 percent likely to favor it.

Majorities of Americans favor an array of specific policies intended to help lower-income individuals respond to climate disasters. When looking at subsidies targeted at lower-income households regarding wildfire, hurricane, and flood insurance, roughly two-thirds of Americans favor such measures. This includes roughly half of Republicans, who are generally less supportive of targeted government support in general (Yen and Zampelli 2023). Only on the question of whether government should provide subsidies to purchase the homes of lower-income people who want to move to live in areas less prone to extreme weather is there majority opposition; and, even here, the data show a roughly even divide in public opinion, with 48 percent in support, and 50 percent in opposition.

Support for policies intended to address environmental injustice depends on the belief that such inequity exists. Americans are about evenly divided about the existence of environmental justice inequities, with 52 percent saying that global warming hurts poorer people more than richer people, and 42 percent saying it hurts both groups equally. 85 percent favor general government action to help poorer people, after being told about the expert consensus about who is most vulnerable to floods, wildfires, and hurricanes made more extreme by a changing climate.

In today’s polarized partisan environment, it is perhaps not surprising that partisanship is the single strongest predictor of evaluations of environmental justice policies. Yet when it comes to policy support, majorities of Republicans endorse the goal of the policies and endorse two of the five implementation strategies to achieve that goal, which are endorsed by still more Independents and Democrats.

Yet partisanship is not the only important factor. Self-interest factors such as income, and to a lesser extent renter status, race, and ethnicity, also appear to play an important role in shaping preferences. These self-interest factors force us to reconsider how the “hierarchy of needs” (Maslow, 1943; 1954) applies to the issue of global warming. In the past, conventional wisdom viewed global warming as the purview of people who already have their basic needs met (Laidley, 2013; Latkin et al., 2021). Yet when viewed through the prism of environmental justice, global warming moves from a matter of self-actualization to a threat to basic physiological needs. Instead of being a “luxury concern” for people that is mostly symbolic and abstract, concern about this environmental issue may instead be driven by the desire to satisfy basic needs for shelter and safety.

People who are aware of the disproportionate impact that global warming has on lower-income communities show greater support for more government action. This finding suggests the potential of informational campaigns to make more people aware of environmental injustices and related policy solutions.