Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on offsetting policies to compensate losers and the number of countries implementing comparable policies. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations, on a disaggregated set of industries, over four time horizons—the very-short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries will be substantial. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in profits is substantially smaller, and the offsetting policies in H.R. 2454 reduce output and profit losses even more. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. We find that the use of the output-based rebates and other allocations in H.R. 2454 can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. Trade or "competitiveness" effects from the carbon price explain a significant portion of the fall in output for EITE sectors, but in absolute terms, the trade impacts are modest and can be reduced or even reversed with the subsidies. The subsidies are less effective, however, in preventing emissions leakage to countries not adopting carbon policies. Roughly half of U.S. trade-related leakage to non-policy countries can be explained by changes in the volume of trade and the other half by higher emissions intensities induced by lower world fuel prices.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on the number of countries implementing the policy as well as offsetting policies to compensate losers. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations to vulnerable industries, over four time horizons—the very short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of industries will indeed be large. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in output and profits is substantially smaller. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. We also consider competitiveness and leakage effects—changes in trade flows and changes in emissions in the rest of the world. We examine two measures of leakage: ?trade-related? leakage that accounts for both the increased volume of net imports into the U.S. as well as the higher carbon intensity of these imports, and a broader leakage measure that includes the effect of increased fossil fuel consumption in countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing policy.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on the number of countries implementing the policy as well as offsetting policies to compensate losers. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations to vulnerable industries, over four time horizons—the very short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of industries will indeed be large. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in output and profits is substantially smaller. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. We also consider competitiveness and leakage effects—changes in trade flows and changes in emissions in the rest of the world. We examine two measures of leakage: “trade-related” leakage that accounts for both the increased volume of net imports into the U.S. as well as the higher carbon intensity of these imports, and a broader leakage measure that includes the effect of increased fossil fuel consumption in countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing policy.

Abstract: This paper informs the discussion of carbon price policies by examining the potential for adverse impacts on domestic industries, with a focus on detailed sector-level analysis. The assumed policyscenario involves a unilateral economy-wide $10/ton CO2 charge without accompanying border tax adjustments or other complementary policies. Four modeling approaches are developed as a proxy for thedifferent time horizons over which firms can pass through added costs, change input mix, adopt new technologies, and reallocate capital. Overall, we find that a readily identifiable set of industries experience particularly adverse impacts as measured by reduced output and that the relative burdens on different industries are remarkably consistent across the four time horizons. Output rebounds considerably over longer time horizons, and the adverse impacts on profits diminish even more rapidly in most cases. Overthe short term employment losses mirror output declines, while gains in other industries fully offset the losses over the longer horizons. At the same time, leakage abroad is considerable in some sectors, particularly when reductions in exports are considered.

Abstract: This paper describes an integrated modeling approach to combine a top-down, recursive CGE model with a bottom-up, electricity-sector model to simulate two categories of policies: 1) assessment of three national-level environmental tax policies (carbon tax, fuel tax, and output tax), and 2) analysis of several mixed national policies with sectoral-level non-price emission caps. The potential co-benefits for China are significant. In addition, the fuel tax or carbon tax, combined with a sector-specific carbon-emission cap policy would be the most effective in terms of the joint objectives on carbon abatement, health co-benefits, and induced technology change.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the sources of U.S. labor productivity growth in the post-1995 period and presents projections for both output and labor productivity growth for the next decade. Despite the recent downward revisions to U.S. GDP and software investment, we show that information technology (IT) played a substantial role in the U.S. productivity revival. We then outline a methodology for projecting trend output and productivity growth. Our base-case projection puts the rate of trend productivity growth at 2.21% per year over the next decade with a range of 1.33 - 2.92%, reflecting fundamental uncertainties about the rate of technological progress in IT-production and investment patterns. Our central projection is only slightly below the average growth rate of 2.36% during the 1995-2000 period.

Abstract:

Who will pay for new policies to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions in the United States? This paper considers a slice of the question by examining the near-term impact on domestic manufacturing industries of both upstream (economy-wide) and downstream (electric power industry only) carbon mitigation policies.

Detailed Census data on the electricity use of four-digit manufacturing industries is combined with input-output information on interindustry purchases to paint a detailed picture of carbon use, including effects on final demand. This approach, which freezes capital and other inputs at current levels and assumes that all costs are passed forward, yields upper-bound estimates of total costs. The results are best viewed as descriptive of the relative burdens within the manufacturing sector rather than as a measure of absolute costs. Overall, the principal conclusion is that within the manufacturing sector (which by definition excludes coal production and electricity generation), only a small number of industries would bear a disproportionate short-term burden of a carbon tax or similar policy. Not surprisingly, an electricity-only policy affects very different manufacturing industries than an economy-wide carbon tax.