Abstract: Brownfields are properties for which redevelopment is hampered by known or suspected contamination and by concerns about associated liability. Because failing to redevelop brownfields may negatively affect welfare and the environment, a number of states have created voluntary programs to reduce liability risks and encourage redevelopment of brownfields. For clean or remediated properties, the state certifies that owners of such sites are not subject to federal or state liability under certain conditions. Certification could increase nearby property values because of decreased contamination risk and amenities associated with redeveloping the brownfield. This paper focuses on the Site Remediation Program in Illinois, and estimates the effect of brownfields certification on nearby property values. Employing several strategies to account for unobserved and time-varying variables that may be correlated with certification, I find that certification of a brownfield 0.25 miles away raises property values by about one percent. In aggregate, the program has increased nearby property values by about two percent.

Abstract: The environmental remediation required to permanently decommissionmost industrial projects is an expensive and irreversible investment. Real options literature shows that temporarily closing a project and postponing decommissioning has value when economic conditions are uncertain and future reactivation is possible. However, high decommissioning costs create an incentive to “temporarily” close a project, even when there is no intention to reactivate. This paper estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of closure to evaluate the likelihood of reactivation. The model reveals that the option to temporarily close is being widely used to avoid environmental remediation of oil and gas wells in Canada.

Abstract: This study examines the redistributional effects of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) using a national database of premium, coverage, and claim payments at the county level between 1980 and 2006. Measuring progressivity as the departure from per capita county income proportionality we find that NFIP premiums are weakly regressive on an annual basis but become proportional as the time horizon is extended beyond a single year. In contrast, we find that NFIP claim payments are moderately progressive over all time horizons studied. In sum, we find no evidence that the NFIP disproportionally advantages richer counties.

Abstract: The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 led to the deaths of 11 workers, a six-month moratorium on deepwater drilling in the Gulf, and nearly three months of massive engineering and logistics efforts to stop the spill. The series of failures before the well was finally capped and the spill contained revealed an inability to deal effectively with a well in deepwater and ultradeepwater. Ensuring that containment capabilities are adequate for drilling operations at these depths is therefore a salient challenge for government and industry. In this paper we assess the Marine Well Containment Company (MWCC), a consortium aimed at designing and building a system capable ofcontaining future deepwater spills in the Gulf. We also consider alternatives for long-term readiness for deepwater spill containment. We focus on the roles of liability and regulation as determinants of readiness and the adequacy of incentives for technological innovation in oil spill containment technology to keep pace with advances in deepwater drilling capability. Liability and regulation can significantly influence the strength of these incentives. In addition, we discuss appropriate governance structure as a major determinant of the effectiveness of MWCC.

Abstract: Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices—often referred to as the safety culture—of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This paper defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may ormay not be adequate or effective from the public’s perspective. Two potential justifications for policy intervention are that: a) not all of the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and b) there may be principal-agency problems within the firm, which could be reduced by external monitoring. The paper discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability, financialresponsibility (a requirement that a firm’s assets exceed a threshold), government oversight, mandatory private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular, the latter three provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability caps without mandating insurance or raising financial responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety culture of smallfirms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred approach wouldbe to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, and to requireinsurance up to the cap.

Abstract: The paper addresses the definition and measurement of liability for marine oil pollution accidents. The economic value of lost or injured ecosystem goods and services is argued to be the most legally, economically, and ecologically defensible measure of damages. This is easier said than done, however. Calculating lost ecological wealth with any precision is an enormous scientific and economic undertaking. The paper proposes practical ways to improve our futureability to calculate such losses.

Abstract: Using rockets to launch communications satellites and other spacecraft poses risks to the uninvolved public, including persons and property under the flight path of the launch vehicle. The federalgovernment plays a pivotal technical role during the actual launch by carrying out certain risk-related procedures, thus causing third-party risk to be jointly produced by the company and the government. In addition, under the Commercial Space Launch Act, the government partially indemnifies commercial launch companies for third-party damages. We compare the indemnification policy to optimal liabilityrules under public-private co-production of risk. Under modest assumptions, shared liability created by the indemnification rules decreases the incentive of both parties to take care relative to the optimum. If care were observable, it would be preferable for the government to fully indemnify companies that take due care. The role of the government as an agent for third parties may qualify these findings.

Abstract: Adapting to climate change will not only require responding to the physical effects of global warming, but will also require adapting the way we conceptualize, measure, and manage risks. Climate change is creating new risks, altering the risks we already face, and also, importantly, impacting the interdependencies between these risks. In this paper we focus on three particular phenomena of climate related risks that will require a change in our thinking about risk management: global micro-correlations, fat tails, and tail dependence. Consideration of these phenomena will be particularly important for natural disaster insurance, as they call into question traditional methods of securitization and diversification.