Abstract: The illegal exploitation of wild abalone in South Africa has been escalating since 1994, despite increased enforcement, leading to collapse in some sections of its range. South Africa banned all wild abalone fishing in 2008 but controversially reopened it in 2010. This paper formulates a poacher’s model, taking into account the realities of the abalone terrain in South Africa—the prevalence of bribery, corruption, use of recreational drugs, and the high value of abalone—to explore why poaching has not subsided. The paper suggests two additional measures that might help ameliorate the situation: eliminating the demand side through enforcement targeted on organized crime, and ceding the resource to the local coastal communities. However, local communities need to be empowered to deal with organised crime groups. Complementary measures to bring back community patriotism will also be needed given the tattered social fabric of the local coastal communities.

Abstract: Namibian hake is the most important fish resource in Namibia. This monograph is a compilation of all the hake data, historic and recent, that has been used to inform stock assessment and management since the late 1970s. It presents the statistical catch-at-age analysis used to evaluate the state of the Namibian hake resource under different assumptions. This analysis treats the two hakes, Merluccius paradoxus and M. capensis, as a single stock. The data and modeling show that the stock has not as yet recovered to its maximum sustainable yield level, despite foreign fishing effort having been removed in 1990. Best estimates suggest the current stock to be roughly 20% of pre-exploitation levels; however this figure is sensitive to model assumptions. Signs indicate that the stock is slowly recovering from its all-time low in 2002-2004. Because the two hake species are pooled for assessment, the resource is currently managed on a relatively simple adaptive basis; 80% of the estimated replacement yield is reserved for fishing, the remainder being left for rebuilding.

Abstract: Although Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) provide an increasingly popular policy tool for protecting marine stocks and biodiversity, they pose high costs for small-scale fisherfolk who have few alternative livelihood options in poor countries. MPAs often address this burden on local households by providing some benefits to compensate locals and/or induce compliance with restrictions. We argue that MPAs in poor countries can only contribute to sustainability if management induces changes in resource-dependent households‘ incentives to fish. With Tanzania‘s Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) and its internal villages as an example, we use an economic decision modeling framework as a lens to examine incentives, reaction to incentives, and implications for sustainable MPA management created by park managers‘ use of enforcement ("sticks") and livelihood projects ("carrots"). We emphasize practical implementation issues faced by MBREMP managers and implications for fostering marine ecosystem sustainability in a poor country setting.

Abstract: The problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review. As the U.S. and other economies have grown, the carrying-capacity of the planet— in regard to natural resources and environmental quality — has become a greater concern, particularly for common-property and open-access resources. The focus of this article is on some important, unsettled problems of the commons. Within the realm of natural resources, there are special challenges associated with renewable resources, which are frequently characterized by openaccess. An important example is the degradation of open-access fisheries. Critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality. A key contribution of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environmental protection. These instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century — global climate change.

Abstract: The nature of competition across space can be fundamentally altered by changes in market institutions. We propose a new framework that allows for the inclusion of market-altering policy changes in the spatial analysis of competitive behavior. This paper fills a gap in the literature between work that focuses on spatial price responsiveness of agents to one another and the literature that explores how policy changes in market regulations affect the competitive behavior of agents. Specifically, we account for how a change in fisheries management (the creation of catch shares) affects the spatial responsiveness of fish processors across a 21-year time period. We also introduce a method that allows for the incorporation of breaks of explanatory variables in spatial panel data sets.

Abstract: Using South Africa’s hake and rock lobster fisheries as examples, this paper argues the need for satellite accounts of South Africa’s commercial fisheries. It stresses the policy role of satellite accounts, particularly where access to fish stocks is contested. Satellite accounts give all interested parties information on the extent of stock depletion, past and present fishing effort, and the returns-to-effort reduction. They can also present the resource rents generated from harvests and the value of the resource stock. Using the United Nations handbook on national accounting for fisheries (SEEAF) to construct physical accounts, the paper indicates the ease with which these could be compiled, albeit with a number of caveats. The paper then extends the results to include monetary accounts, but warns that the current guidelines embody flaws that can yield anomalous results.

Abstract: This study deals with fisheries and trade, focusing on developing countries. Fish is globally traded, and for many developing countries, it is an important net export good. In most of these countries, fisheries are often characterized by poorly defined property rights, accompanied by overcapitalization where too many vessels and fishermen catch too few fish from too small stocks. Management is often de facto open access, where vessels with or without permission to fish land as much as they can catch dueto limited monitoring and enforcement activities. Even in developed countries, many fisheries are poorly managed, and recent studies indicate that marine ecosystems are in global decline. While tradegenerally is beneficial for growth and welfare, the combination of pure open access and trade liberalization may both reduce welfare and stocks for a country—an outcome that can be reinforced bythe common use of bad subsidies. However, trade liberalization may have an additional positive impact by promoting the development of property rights in response to increased fish exploitation. The WTOcan play a role by adopting a broader classification of subsidies to help eliminate bad subsidies, such as like public support of vessel construction, fuel subsidies, or fishing rights outside developing coastal countries provided at limited or zero cost. The WTO can also ssist by distinguishing good subsidies (e.g., improving fisheries management or improving monitoring and enforcement), which are desirable targets when rich countries allocate aid resource to developing countries.