Abstract: To address the climate change issue, developed nations have considered introducing carbon pricing mechanisms in the form of a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Despite the small number of programs actually in operation, these mechanisms remain under active discussion in a number of countries, including Japan. Using an input–output model of the Japanese economy, this paper analyzes the effects of carbon pricing on Japan‘s industrial sector. We also examine the impact of a rebate program of the type proposed for energy intensive trade exposed (EITE) industries in U.S. legislation, the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454), and in the European Union‘s ETS. We find that a carbon pricing scheme would impose a disproportionate burden on a limited number of sectors—namely, pig iron, crude steel (converters), cement, and other EITE industries. We also find that the determinant of the increase in total cost differs among industries, depending on the relative inputs of directly combusted fossil fuel, electricity, or steam, as well as intermediate goods. Out of 401 industries, 23 would be eligible for rebates if a Waxman–Markey type of program were adopted in Japan. Specifically, the 85 percent rebate provided to eligible industries under H.R. 2454 would significantly reduce the cost of direct and indirect fossil fuel usage. The E.U. criteria identify 120 industries eligible for rebates. However, the E.U. program only covers direct emissions while the U.S. program includes indirect emissions as well. Overall, despite the differences in coverage, we find that the Waxman–Markey and E.U. rebate programs have roughly similar impacts in reducing the average burdens on EITE industries.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on offsetting policies to compensate losers and the number of countries implementing comparable policies. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations, on a disaggregated set of industries, over four time horizons—the very-short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries will be substantial. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in profits is substantially smaller, and the offsetting policies in H.R. 2454 reduce output and profit losses even more. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. We find that the use of the output-based rebates and other allocations in H.R. 2454 can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. Trade or "competitiveness" effects from the carbon price explain a significant portion of the fall in output for EITE sectors, but in absolute terms, the trade impacts are modest and can be reduced or even reversed with the subsidies. The subsidies are less effective, however, in preventing emissions leakage to countries not adopting carbon policies. Roughly half of U.S. trade-related leakage to non-policy countries can be explained by changes in the volume of trade and the other half by higher emissions intensities induced by lower world fuel prices.

Abstract: Current and proposed greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems allow regulated entities to offset abatement requirements by paying unregulated entities to abate. These offsets from unregulated entitiesare believed to contain system costs and stabilize allowance prices. However, the supply of offsets is highly uncertain. Furthermore, the offset supply uncertainty may be correlated with other sources ofuncertainty in emissions trading systems. This paper presents a model that incorporates both uncertainties in the supply of offsets and in abatement costs. Using numerical methods we solve the model under avariety of parameter settings, including a system that includes allowance price controls. We find that as uncertainty in offsets and uncertainty in abatement costs become more negatively correlated, expected abatement plus offset purchase costs increase, as does the variability in allowance prices and emissions from the regulated sector. Imposing an allowance price collar that limits the upper and lower cost substantially mitigates cost increases as well as the variability in prices and emissions, while roughly maintaining expected environmental outcomes.

Abstract: We use a stochastic dynamic framework to compare price collars (price ceilings and floors) in a cap-and-trade system. Sources of uncertainty include shocks to baseline emissions, affectingcorresponding abatement costs, and shocks to the supply of offsets. We consider a continuum between soft collars, which have a limited volume of additional emission allowances (a reserve) available at theprice ceiling, and hard collars, which provide an unlimited supply of additional allowances, thereby preventing allowance prices from exceeding the price ceiling. For all cases considered, we set the price floors and ceiling such that the expected cumulative emissions net of offsets are equal to the cumulative allowances. Consequently, increasing the size of the allowance reserve requires higher price ceilings and floors, and a lower probability of reaching the ceiling. Across most parameter values examined, we find that increasing the size of the allowance reserve leads to lower expected net present values of compliance costs, although the differences are not large. However, when offset supply shocks are highly persistent and exhibit strong (negative) correlation with baseline emission shocks, hard collars deliver noticeably lower expected costs, though with a wider range of emission outcomes than the soft collars.

Abstract: This study estimates the impacts on a disaggregated set of California industries of introducing a carbon pricing policy within the state. Two time horizons are considered, the “very short run” and the “short run”. To limit adverse impacts on the state’s energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries, we develop illustrative policy options involving free allowance allocations of emissions permits to particular industries and limited border adjustments on coal, natural gas, crude oil, and refined petroleum product imports, as well as on electricity. Overall, we find relatively small impacts on energy-intensive industries with the rebates in place. The average reduction in EITE output is 0.4 percent. There is, however, considerable variation in impacts among the EITE industries. We also find that the ability to pass on costs, as assumed in the short run case, dramatically reduces adverse profit impacts to less than 1.5 percent in most cases, regardless of the rebate scenario. Based on national-level modeling done outside of this study, we estimate that over the long term, the average EITE output losses with the rebates in place would be expected to be somewhat smaller than the results reported here.

Abstract: This study compares and contrasts regulatory and related practices—in particular, regulatory decisionmaking, risk assessment and planning processes, inspection and compliance, and organization structure, budgets, and training—of the Minerals Management Service (MMS, now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, or BOEMRE) with those of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Comparing MMS practices withthose of other federal agencies that also manage low-probability but high-consequence environmental risks provides a basis for identifying opportunities for enhancing regulatory capacity and safety performance in managing deepwater energy exploration and production. Our research finds important differences in processes for setting standards; peer review contribution to the rulemaking process; establishment of tolerable risk thresholds; and training of key staff. The paper concludes with several recommendations for how various EPA and FAA practices might be modified and used at BOEMRE to strengthen its regulatory and risk management processes.

Abstract: The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on the number of countries implementing the policy as well as offsetting policies to compensate losers. We examine the effects of a $15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations to vulnerable industries, over four time horizons—the very short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher costs, the loss in profits in a number of industries will indeed be large. When output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in output and profits is substantially smaller. Over the medium- and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to general equilibrium effects. The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can substantially offset the output losses over all four time frames considered. We also consider competitiveness and leakage effects—changes in trade flows and changes in emissions in the rest of the world. We examine two measures of leakage: ?trade-related? leakage that accounts for both the increased volume of net imports into the U.S. as well as the higher carbon intensity of these imports, and a broader leakage measure that includes the effect of increased fossil fuel consumption in countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing policy.